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Turing’s Thinking Machines: Resonances with 
Surrealism & the Avant-Garde of the Early 20th Century 
Klemens E. James1
 
Abstract.  This paper examines the thinking machines depicted 
in the visual and theoretical works of Surrealism and other 
avant-garde movements of the early 20th century. The aim is to 
establish to what extent the conceptions of these machines 
prefigure Turing’s ideas about the mechanical brain. Whereas 
Surrealism and its artistic antecedents (such as the Dadaists) are 
generally thought to have been uninterested in or mistrustful of 
such technological developments, it will shown that a number of 
artists/theorists (Ernst, Duchamp, Picabia, Hausmann, Matta, 
Dalí, Caillois) envisaged the notion of the thinking machine in a 
manner which anticipated a number of Turing’s ideas (the 
gendered machine, machine consciousness, the child-machine,  
pleasure-pain systems, randomness).   
 
1 INTRODUCTION11 
 
In his 1950 article ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ Alan 
Turing asked the question ‘can machines think?’ and predicted 
that ‘at the end of the century the use of words and general 
educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able 
to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be 
contradicted’[1].  His statements were visionary, the product of a 
mind very much ahead of it time, especially given today’s 
reliance on computers to conduct intellectual operations that 
were previously the work of the human mind. This paper aims to 
show how Turing’s vision of a thinking machine was the 
preoccupation of many of his contemporaries and his immediate 
antecedents, not in the scientific world but in the European 
avant-garde, particularly in Dada and Surrealism. In so doing I 
want to challenge two principal assumptions: that of the 
irreconcilability of the sciences and arts, but also that all voices 
within Surrealism and its immediate precursors were 
uninterested in or opposed to the evolution of technology, and 
the further modelling of machine upon man.2  Whereas it is true 
that two of Surrealism’s founding fathers, André Breton and 
Max Ernst, were somewhat dismissive of science, they, like all 
Surrealists, were profoundly influenced by the scientific writer 
Gaston Bachelard in Nouvel Esprit Scientifique [2] (1934) which 
situated Surrealism and modern physics ‘in a non-classical, non-
Cartesian, non-Newtonian, non-Kantian epistemology’[3] and 
showed how the imagination could yield new scientific 
paradigms, news forms of architecture and space, new forms of 
poetry and thinking; this, according to Bachelard, occurred at the 
threshold between the conscious and subconscious mind, and the  
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inner reality of the self and materiality of the outer world. 
Inspired by Bachelard’s theories, the Surrealists attempted to 
harness the knowledge gleaned from these liminal states not only 
for their creative projects but also to intuit and depict a vision of 
the future (and the role of machines and robots within it).   
The Surrealists took on Bachelard’s merging of the conscious 
and unconscious mind as part of a broader project to reconcile 
the antinomies of nature [4,5] (this not only fitted in with their 
belief in a Hegelian-inspired dialectics but formed the basis of 
their aesthetic). In their iconography and writings, experiments 
in reconciling oppositional concepts resulted in depictions of 
man merging with machine.  The man-machine hybrid could be 
seen in the works of Max Ernst, Marcel Duchamp, Francis 
Picabia, Roberto Matta, Salvador Dalí and Roger Caillois – and 
although Ernst and Duchamp were deeply mistrustful of machine 
technology, the others viewed it in a rather more nuanced (and 
even more positive) light, even going so far as to postulate the 
future development of an intelligent machine.  
Surrealist scholar Dawn Ades interprets Breton’s underlying 
message in the First Surrealist Manifesto as ‘“we as poets have 
just as much right to do research and do experiments in this field 
as the scholars and scientists do”. And so, he was setting up 
Surrealism [...] as a kind of arena for experiment’[6]. 
2 THINKING MACHINES IN THE EUROPEAN  
AVANT-GARDE OF THE EARLY 20TH 
CENTURY 
 
2.1 Artistic consciousness in the Machine Age  
 
This paper begins by surveying the general view of thinking 
machines within the cultural and artistic movements of early 20th 
century Europe2 – and how this helped pave the way for the 
Surrealists’ conception of such an invention. Historically 
speaking the early 20th century coincided with the end of the 
Second Industrial revolution (also known as the Machine Age). 
This saw the rise of mass consumption and the production line, 
Herman Hollerith’s tabulation machines [7] (first distributed by 
IBM in 1924), telephone and radio technology, industrial, 
printing and military equipment, as well as improved 
transportation (in the form of trains, automobiles and aircraft).  
Whether at work, in leisure or in warfare, this was an age which 
                                                
2 In so doing, the paper develops the invaluable work already done in this 
field by Gavin Parkinson in Surrealism, art, and modern science: 
relativity, quantum mechanics, epistemology (2008) who has shown how 
Surrealists frequently drew on scientific theory to inform both theory and 
practice. 
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was to bring man and the machine inexorably closer together; an 
age which was also to forge the artistic and scientific conscience 
of the Western avant-garde and a generation of scientists to 
which Turing belonged (scientists who drew on the knowledge 
of this industrial age only to become pioneers of the information 
age).  
According to Foster in Prosthetic Gods, the anticipation of a 
closer alliance of man and machine was common to avant-garde 
movements in  many western countries, occurring: ‘in Futurism 
in Italy, Vorticism in England, Purism in France, Precisionism in 
the United States, Neue Sachlichkeit in Germany, and 
Constructivism in Russia and elsewhere’[8]. Apart from 
Surrealism’s prefiguration of a number of Turing’s ideas, these 
movements did not generally demonstrate the viability of 
machine intelligence per se, but rather confirmed the fascination 
we have with human-like qualities of machine performance (as 
well as the machine-like, automatic qualities of humans). They 
also highlighted the encroachment of machines upon the domain 
of human industry, and the varying emotional reactions that 
thinking machines and mechanical men elicited. Individual 
members of the latter avant-garde movements reacted to these 
notions with a mixture of awe and jubilation, on the one hand, 
and extreme trepidation, on the other.  
 
2.2  Futurism, Vorticism and the cult of the 
       machine 
 
One of the most confident predictions that machines would one 
day be able to think came from the Futurists whose spokesman 
Filippo Marinetti considered the oft-made assertion made by car 
owners and factory directors that vehicles appear to have ‘a 
personality, a soul, will’ to be indicative of a ‘sensibility of the 
machine’[9]. In another Futurist manifesto of 1914, his 
colleagues Bruno Corra and Emilio Settimelli wrote ‘there is no 
essential difference between a human brain and a machine. It is 
mechanically more complicated, that is all. For example, a type-
writer is a primitive organism governed by a logic that is 
imposed in it by its construction’[9].  In addition to machines 
simulating organic life, humans were also encouraged by the 
Futurists to become more machine-like, denuding themselves of 
love, sentiment, filial attachments and irrationality. The Futurists 
also glorified the machine gun and war.  
The Vorticists, who were based in Great Britain, denounced 
the Futurist’s fetishisation of technology and their ‘lyrical shouts 
about the God-Automobile’[10], which to them represented a 
cult that was no more credible than Voodooism. In a manner 
evoking the Futurists, however, they proclaimed that ‘a machine 
is in a greater or less degree, a living thing’[10] while critiquing 
their depictions of machines in ‘violent movement’, which to 
them resulted in nothing more than a blur or a kaleidoscope; ‘the 
very spirit of the machine is lost’[11] bewailed  the movement’s 
co-founder Wyndham Lewis.  
In their assertions Filippo Marinetti and Wyndham Lewis 
were not unlike those of Turing, who also believed that machines 
had the potential to perform many of the cerebral operations of 
the human brain which were fundamental to intelligence. In his 
article ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’[1], he also left 
open the possibility of machines developing conscience. He did 
this by arguing against his contemporary, the neurosurgeon 
Geoffrey Jefferson, who had insisted that computers would not 
become in any sense living until they were able to feel emotions 
or passions, succumb to flights of inspiration or become fallible 
like humans. Turing riposted that this would presume we could 
only truly know of someone else’s feelings (machine or person), 
if we became them; and that such an argument amounted to 
nothing more than a defence of solipsism. This would mean that 
the only knowledge of which we could be certain would be 
derived from our own selves, our internal processes, our own 
thoughts and emotions. In making this a criticism, Turing tacitly 
entertained the possibility of a conscious machine, whilst 
conceding that there is some mystery about consciousness[1]. 
 
2.3  Machines out of control: World War One and  
       Metropolis 
 
Let us return to the attitude of the avant-garde towards the notion 
of the intelligent machine. Following the realities of World War 
One, and the devastating impact of military armaments upon 
human life, a number of cultural and artistic movements became 
ambivalent or critical about the prospect of further technological 
development and the creation of a thinking machine. Vorticists 
and Expressionists who previously extolled technology now 
became sceptical about it. Dadaists and Surrealists were 
publically dismissive of technology, though willing nonetheless 
to employ those new media, which had resulted from the Second 
Industrial revolution (such as film and photography as well as 
typing and printing machines). And, as we have already 
established, neither Dadaists nor Surrealists could escape the 
conceptualisation of man as machine (and vice-versa) in their 
works.  
Significant reappraisals of technology’s value occurred within 
the avant-garde of Germany, including those that helped to 
define Surrealism’s view of a machine-driven future. In 1927, 
the film Metropolis [12], an Expressionist film vividly portrayed 
the bringing to life of a robotic woman who is cloned from the 
city’s proletariat leader and visionary, Maria. Maria is so 
convincing in her femininity that she is first employed as a 
dancing performer for the men of the upper classes, fuelling their 
lust for her and aggression toward each other as they vie for her 
attention. She is subsequently sent by the city’s evil capitalist 
leader to incite rebellion amongst the working classes, so that he 
has a pretext to crush their dissent and reinforce his power over 
the city. Somewhat ironically, she also urges the proletariat to 
destroy all the industrial machines, which they work on by day. 
Mankind’s integration with the machine is presented as dystopic, 
though this is hardly surprising given the devastation wreaked 
upon the world by the killing machines of World War One. 
 The film can also be interpreted in the light of Turing’s ideas, 
particularly his test for machines in order to establish whether 
they can be considered in any way intelligent.  The so-called 
Turing Test requires the machine to fool a human interrogator 
into believing it is of one particular sex or another. The 
interrogator also questions another participant who is an actual 
human of the opposite sex to the one which the machine is 
assuming, though both the human and machine are concealed 
behind a screen so that the interrogator has no knowledge of who 
is who.  
In Metropolis, a similar process takes place whereby the 
human heroine, Maria, is captured and thus taken out of the 
narrative only to be replaced by a robotic Doppelgänger. The 
responses the imposter elicits, both erotic and verbal, are 
sufficient to indicate that her audience (who have a similar 
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function to the interrogator) have been totally duped into 
believing she is a woman. As Julia Dover states in her article on 
Turing and Metropolis ‘the film plays disturbingly with the site 
of consciousness and authority in the relationship of human and 
machine (like the Turing test)’[13] – referring to robotic Maria’s 
capacity to embody consciousness and to wield power, in a 
manner which makes her pass as human to all who encounter 
her. 
3   CRITIQUE OF THE THINKING MACHINE:  
    MAX ERNST AND MARCEL DUCHAMP 
One erstwhile Expressionist who became a leading figure in both 
Dada and Surrealism was Max Ernst. In the immediate aftermath 
of the First World War, Ernst produced a series of 50 works 
based on machines and scientific instruments as a part of his 
early Dada phase. Dada was in rupture with those movements 
such as Futurism, which had sought to glorify the machine and 
foster its integration into human life. For this reason, a number 
of Ernst’s diagrammatic works depicted machinery with human 
traits in a way that satirised or critiqued the notion of the living 
machine. As Foster affirms: ‘this parodic presentation of the 
military-industrial subject is not only a riposte to fascist visions 
of war and masculinity. More generally, in keeping with German 
Dada at large ... , it is an insult to the humanist ideals of art and 
individuality cherished by the classes that forced the war in the 
first place’[8]. There was no doubt that Ernst perceived the 
realities of a fusion between intelligent man and machine, having 
been witness to the imperious role played by technology in the 
war and the increasing industrialisation of Europe. It was, 
however, the machine’s capacity to dehumanise man (rather than 
its ability to become itself a thinking, sentient being) that Ernst 
found unsettling.  
Two of Ernst’s works reveal anthropomorphic machines, 
which are indicative of his attitude. The first, The Hat Makes the 
Man, reveals a human subject usurped on the one hand by 
phallic-shaped mechanical structures, all which are capped by 
the fetishised commodities of mass industrial production (in this 
case the hats, which also suggest a form of phallic 
embellishment). The second entitled Fiat modes, pereat ars 
represents the inversion of Latin saying fiat ars, pereat vita (‘let 
there be art, life is fleeting’). The revised title translates as ‘let 
there be fashion, art is fleeting’, again, signifying the modern 
subject in the grip of commodity fetishism and conditioned 
principally by industrial and mechanical processes. The male 
tailor depicted in the drawing partakes in these processes by 
measuring up and working upon the model (both tailor and 
model appear as automata). Whereas Turing speaks about 
machines in terms of their future evolution as intelligent, 
reasoning entities, Ernst highlights the flipside of the equation – 
that as machines evolve, and become ever more intelligent, 
humans are stupefied, especially as their reliance on the latter 
grows. 
As noted earlier, Ernst had allowed the mechanical structures 
of The Hat Makes the Man to appear phallic in nature; indeed 
many of his diagrammatic works had presented monolithic 
machines as precariously erected phallic edifices. Many of the 
gendered machines depicted in Surrealist and avant-garde 
artworks didn’t resemble men or women in a physical sense 
(their gender being expressed by means of symbolism or 
metonymically). This brings us back to the Turing Test and the 
question of just how persuasive a machine must be as a man or 
woman in order to be considered intelligent. In fact, Turing 
believed that thinking machines could convince the interrogator 
of their gender irrespective of external appearances: ‘No 
engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material 
which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible 
that at some time this might be done, but even supposing this 
invention available we should feel there was little point in trying 
to make a 'thinking machine' more human by dressing it up in 
such artificial flesh’[1]. We thus have a further area of 
correspondence between the avant-garde and Turing whereby 
machines are portrayed as imitating human behaviour and 
intelligence in terms of their status as gendered beings without 
necessarily sharing all their physical attributes.  
Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia, who were associated 
with both Dada and Surrealism also produced works depicting 
gendered machines.  Duchamp’s painting Nude Descending a 
Staircase depicts a female walking down a staircase in a manner 
that evokes stroboscopic motion photography (a photograph 
created by a succession of superimposed images). By his own 
admission he was influenced by the stop-motion photography of 
Étienne-Jules Marey, exemplified by the photo Man Walking 
[14,15]. Nude Descending a Staircase mediates a sense of 
kineticism, which seems redolent of Futurism, though Duchamp 
was by no means the technophile that Marinetti was (despite 
being knowledgeable about science). According to Linda 
Henderson the work ‘stands as his first fully realized response to 
Cubism's pursuit of the invisible realities suggested by the 
discovery of X-rays in 1895. At the same time, Duchamp 
deliberately distinguished that work from the Cubist style by 
incorporating both a figure in motion (virtually never seen in 
Cubism) and the humorous implications of X-ray stripping (here 
both the clothing and flesh of the nude disappear)’[16].  Rather 
strikingly, the stripping down of the human subject to its skeletal 
form (whose kinetic energies are visibly highlighted) gives it a 
highly robotic appearance. 
Duchamp’s influences (x-rays, invisible realities, 
stroboscopic photography) are interesting in so far as they reflect 
the impact of the Machine Age upon human consciousness. His 
work expresses an ambiguity by which we are uncertain as to 
whether the female subject is a human depicted under its 
mechanical guise or a robot depicted under a human guise (an 
ambiguity which we will witness time and again in the works of 
the avant-gardists). While being dismissive of science and art’s 
more grandiose claims, Duchamp aimed in his own words at 
achieving in his works a ‘juxtaposition of mechanical elements 
and visceral forms’[17]. Up to the time he had produced the 
painting he had moreover been involved in another avant-garde 
movement known as the Section d’Or or the Puteaux group, an 
offshoot of Cubism, which sought to express geometrical 
perfection in its paintings and endorsed the achievements of 
science and technology 
4  THE LEARNING MACHINES OF FRANCIS    
     PICABIA AND RAOUL HAUSMANN  
Strongly influenced by Duchamp, Francis Picabia produced 
many paintings in the years 1915-1922 whose imagery has been 
termed mechanomorphic, in other words, striving to imitate the 
forms of machines. This stylistic turn was first inspired by a visit 
to New York, upon which he remarked: ‘I have been profoundly 
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impressed by the vast mechanical development in America. The 
machine has become more than a mere adjunct of life. It is really 
a part of human life ... perhaps the very soul’[18]. Like 
Duchamp, Picabia emphasises the interconnectedness of man 
and machine, though unlike the latter (and very nihilistic spirit of 
Dada in general), he was willing to entertain the machine’s more 
positive (functional and aesthetic) qualities. Moreover, to claim 
the machine constitutes the soul of human life does suggest a 
certain kinship with Turing’s thinking. Picabia implies that the 
machine is not only man’s central preoccupation, but that man’s 
original preoccupations with himself and his own endeavours 
has been supplanted by the machine’s capacities to perform so 
many of the tasks of everyday life (including, invariably, those 
which require intelligence).  
A friend and associate of Picabia’s, Paul Haviland, was a 
critical influence on the artist’s life, especially in terms of how 
he theorised upon humanity’s relationship to machines. Haviland 
and Picabia had collaborated on the same New York-based 
avant-garde journal 291, and Picabia had painted his friend in the 
form of an electrical lamp as if to pay testament to his ingenuity 
and interest in mechanical media such as photography. 
Commenting on the importance of the machine, Haviland had 
stated that: 
 
We are living in the age of the machine. Man made the 
machine in his own image. She has limbs which act; 
lungs which breathe; a heart which beats; a nervous 
system through which runs electricity. The 
phonograph is the image of his voice; the camera the 
image of his eye.[19]  
 
There is a striking similarity between Haviland’s words and 
another of Turing’s texts in which he lays out a methodology for 
creating a thinking machine, involving the replacement of each 
part of the human body with machinery that performs the 
equivalent function: 
 
A great positive reason for believing in the possibility 
of making thinking machinery is the fact that it is 
possible to make machinery to imitate any small part 
of a man. That the microphone does this for the ear, 
and the television camera for the eye, are 
commonplaces. One can also produce remote 
controlled Robots whose limbs balance the body with 
the aid of servo-mechanisms. [...] The electrical 
circuits which are used in electronic computing 
machinery seem to have the essential properties of 
nerves.[20] 
 
A further similarity between Haviland and Turing, as well as 
Haviland and Picabia is the engineering of a machine in the 
image of a human child, which is subsequently brought up and 
educated by its human creator, as noted by Haviland: 
 
The machine is his “daughter born without a mother”. 
That is why he loves her. [...] But the machine is yet at 
a dependent stage [....] She submits to his will but he 
must direct her activities....[19] 
  
Haviland’s comments about the machine being man’s 
‘daughter born without a mother’ encapsulated one of Picabia’s 
major preoccupations, as reflected in two of his works, which 
bore exactly this title Daughter born without a mother. The first, 
which is a drawing, represents an early attempt at developing his 
mechanomorphic style; the second, a painting, shows the style at 
a more developed stage of its evolution. Unlike in Duchamp’s 
oeuvre, Picabia’s subjects are not gendered in these and most of 
his other works. However, the notion of his machine as a child, 
which is still ‘at a dependent stage’ is certainly germane to 
Turing’s thought.  
Turing speculates that in order for a machine to become 
intelligent, it is preferable to train and educate it like a child. The 
process by which a machine is taught to think ‘should bear a 
close relation of that of teaching.’[20] Starting from a tabula rasa 
the machine would thus learn behaviours and aptitudes that 
would lead to it becoming intelligent:  
 
Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate 
the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one 
which simulates the child's? If this were then 
subjected to an appropriate course of education one 
would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the child-
brain is something like a note-book as one buys it 
from the stationers. Rather little mechanism, and lots 
of blank sheets.[1] 
 
Turing refers to the machines who follow such a program as 
‘child-machines’, a term which evokes Picabia’s idea of a 
‘daughter born without a mother’ who is still in need of the 
guidance of her creator.  
Turing’s quasi-constructivist ideas about the development of 
the child-machine can be related to a Dadaist work: Raoul 
Hausmann’s The Mechanical Head, which had the subtitle of 
The Spirit of Our Age. Hausmann, who was the leader of Berlin 
Dada, sought to challenge the notion that intelligence was innate 
and that the genius of artists and poets was an inexplicable god-
given attribute.  
Various objects have been attached to the surface of his 
assemblage, which resembles a robotic head, suggesting that 
humans (and, potentially machines, as there is an ambiguity 
here) are conditioned and educated principally by external 
influences. Significantly, many of the objects on the side of the 
head are employed for mechanical or scientific operations: 
measuring devices, ruler, pocket watch mechanism, typewriter 
and camera segments. Hausmann thus seeks to question both the 
nature of man’s inner self in the Machine Age and the processes 
by which he evolves into a thinking, reasoning individual: 
 
What is the purpose of spirit in a world that proceeds 
mechanically? What is man?  He can be both a happy 
and a sorry affair, and he is formed and spoken 
through his mode of production, his social 
environment. You see.... you believe you think and 
make decisions, you believe yourself to be original – 
and what happens? The social environment [...] has 
thrown the soul-machine into gear and the whole thing 
runs itself.[21] 
 
The notion that intelligence evolves both as an upward 
expanding spiral from childhood and in relation to one’s 
surroundings has resonances with important theories of 
education and cognitive psychology which were being 
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developed at the time. The Swiss developmental psychologist 
Jean Piaget propounded the idea that children behaved almost 
like little scientists, making and testing hypotheses fairly 
independently in order to construct an understanding of the 
world [22]. In the process they would adapt their mental 
structures to meet the demands of the environment and 
progressively become intelligent, reasoning adults. Piaget’s 
theories point to a remarkable confluence of ideas within art, 
science and developmental psychology, which take the tabula 
rasa of the child (and its subsequent epistemological evolution) 
as the basis for acquiring intelligence.  
5   MATTA, DALÍ AND THE INSPIRATION OF  
     SCIENCE 
 
5.1 Matta, pain and consciousness 
 
The painting of Roberto Matta, a Chilean Surrealist artist, 
extended the notion of the thinking machine by combining the 
concepts of psychoanalysis and science in his paintings. He 
affirmed that ‘a new school of painters could evolve from 
contemporary physics, as an earlier school (Surrealism) had 
evolved from modern psychology’[23]. Having studied 
architecture, he attempted to depict the architecture of the soul in 
terms of non-Euclidean geometry in paintings known as 
‘inscapes’. The word inscape is a portmanteau term denoting the 
interiority of the self as expressed through landscapes of external 
morphology. Matta also depicted outer reality as a reflection of 
the latest scientific discoveries (such as relativity, sub-atomic 
quanta and the latest inventions of the Machine Age).  
Many of his paintings showed the implications of these 
discoveries for the future, including the proliferation of 
biomechanical mutations.  The future as he saw it could be both 
vital and menacing. In the painting Octrui, we witness a 
menacing scene: industrial robots working on a production line 
blur the boundaries between man and machine, displaying clear 
organic characteristics. As with the machine of the Turing test 
these robots are gendered, albeit that their sexual attributes 
similarly straddle the organic and the mechanical (their genitalia 
resembling mechanical spiders!). According to the Surrealists’ 
spokesman, André Breton, these were robots ‘carrying harrows 
on their backs and wearing crossbows round their necks..... but 
who nevertheless maintain a frenzied lingual and genital 
commerce’[24]. The harrows, crossbows and other sharp 
implements mediate an atmosphere that is violent, clinical and 
disturbing. In Octrui and Wound Interrogation (which typify 
Matta’s iconography in the 1940s and 1950s), we even have the 
impression that robots are being controlled by pleasure-pain 
systems. Turing discusses such systems in relation to machine 
learning. If the machine is to be made to think in the manner of a 
child, then: 
 
The organisation of a machine into a universal 
machine would be most impressive if the 
arrangements of interference involve very few inputs. 
The training of the human child depends largely on a 
system of rewards and punishments, and this suggests 
that it ought to be possible to carry through the 
organising with only two interfering inputs, one for 
‘pleasure’ o-r ‘reward’ (R) and the other for ‘pain’ or 
‘punishment’ (P).[20] 
 
In Wound Interrogation, we see a robot appearing to analyse 
a sizeable wound of the human flesh, which is nonetheless 
integrated into a network of robots surrounding it.  The fact that 
the wound is being subjected to such scrutiny suggests that it is 
able to yield information and that the robot has something to 
gain from interrogating it. The process reminds one somewhat of 
Turing’s comments on the value of pain in helping the machine 
to evolve:  
 
Pleasure interference has a tendency to fix the 
character i.e. towards preventing it changing, whereas 
pain stimuli tend to disrupt the character, causing 
features which had become fixed to change, or to 
become again subject to random variation.[20] 
 
We are, however, confronted here with an ambiguity similar 
to that in the works of Duchamp and Hausmann, as we cannot be 
certain whether these figures are humans with mechanical 
properties, or machines with humanoid traits. If the former, then 
our future appears dystopian, with humans becoming slaves to 
industrial processes and barely distinguishable from the 
production line upon which they operate; if, on the other hand, 
they are thinking robots, then we can again see a prefiguration of 
the type of intelligent (and gendered) machine postulated by 
Turing, which is guided like a child and responds to stimuli of 
pleasure and pain.  
 
5.2  Dalí, quantum mechanics and randomness 
 
For the painter Salvador Dalí physics was ‘the new geometry of 
thought’[25] and he too saw the artist as an interpreter of the 
scientific phenomena of his time. Like Matta, he had been 
inspired by Freudian psychoanalysis in order to depict the inner 
life and by scientific theory in order to represent external reality. 
He was influenced above all by Einstein’s theory of 
relativity[26] and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. 
Heisenberg had made foundational contributions to quantum 
mechanics, asserting that it was impossible to record 
simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle without 
the measuring equipment of one impacting upon the nature of 
the other. In other words, the observer had a direct impact on the 
phenomena he was measuring. Dalí used this idea to draw 
parallels between science and human conscience and create a 
new artistic style known as nuclear mysticism. He sought to 
show how the observer of the physical world could, from his 
own subjective viewpoint, also help to shape its reality (this idea 
extended his famed paranoiac critical method): ‘From a quantum 
mechanics standpoint, Dalí’s double [i.e. illusionistic] images 
perfectly reflect Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: what one 
sees depends on the observer. In the same way as he had done 
with Freud, Dalí assimilated a new scientific theory and 
reworked it visually’[6]. It must be stressed here that Dalí’s 
eccentric mix of science and art takes us quite far from the 
quantum mechanics of the laboratory, becoming rather a science 
of subjectivity (which, as will shortly be demonstrated, is 
nonetheless germane to Turing’s thought).  
Dalí’s interest in quantum mechanics was further reflected in 
his works by depicting his subjects as agglomerations of sub-
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atomic particles. As we will now see, these particles, which were 
shaped like rhinoceros horns (i.e. perfect logarithmic spirals), 
were shown to be common to material objects as well as human 
consciousness.  
The painting Raphaelesque Head Exploding represents a head 
composed of a plethora of spiral-shaped particles. This image 
challenges our view of the integrity of matter and the appearance 
of coherent phenomena which are, in fact, totally fragmented. 
Whereas the painting represents a head in its externality, The 
Disintegration of the Persistence of Memory, portrays the 
interiority of the head, and specifically man’s consciousness of 
the passing of time in its subjective, non-linear aspect. 
Significantly, this inner world is also shown as being composed 
of the same sub-atomic particles.  
What interests us in Dalí’s theories, especially in how they 
relate to Turing’s, is this connection between thought and 
quantum mechanics. Turing believed that one component within 
a thinking machine had to be capable of random behaviour in 
order for it to imitate human thinking convincingly: Turing ‘had 
a deep-seated conviction that the real brain has a ‘‘roulette 
wheel’’ somewhere in it’ [20]. Although Turing affirms that a 
thinking machine should, to a substantial degree function 
according to predictable processes, being of a type that 
resembles a calculator (rather than a bulldozer), he concedes that 
this is not always possible: 
 
It was also necessary that this machine should be of 
the sort whose behaviour is in principle predictable by 
calculation. We certainly do not know how any such 
calculation should be done, and it was even argued by 
Sir Arthur Eddington that on account of the 
indeterminacy principle in quantum mechanics no 
such prediction is even theoretically possible. [27] 
   
Interestingly it is on the basis of quantum mechanics that he 
casts doubt over the possibility of a machine operating entirely 
by deterministic principles. As scientists have discovered in 
quantum mechanical experiments, the behaviour of wave 
functions, when measured, appears to be quite random. Turing’s 
reference to Sir Arthur Eddington and quantum theory to 
establish the limits of predictability in machine behaviour 
suggests that machines need to display signs of randomness if 
they are ever to simulate human intelligence. Randomness is a 
concept which Turing returns to time after time in his writings, 
and, in so doing, he underlines the wisdom of including a 
random element in a learning machine[20]. If, for example, a 
digital computer can perform the equivalent operation of 
throwing a die, it might produce numbers which can be kept in a 
store for future functions or can be helped to generate random 
approaches at solving a particular problem[20] (in other words, 
engage in trial-and-error style interrogations). Moreover, if a 
program allows for random behaviours it may even allow a 
computer to exhibit a certain amount of ‘free will’, though this is 
not a term, which Turing necessarily favoured [20]. 
Dalí effectively extends Turing’s ideas by suggesting that the 
‘quantum’ randomness of human thought not only determines 
behaviour but, much more radically, the nature of reality as 
perceived by the consciousness. 
 
6  DALÍ, CAILLOIS AND THE PROPHECY OF  
    THE MECHANICAL BRAIN 
In addition to exploring the quantum nature of the human mind, 
Dalí shared Turing’s conviction about the possibility of thinking 
machines. In an interview with Alain Bosquet he stated: 
 
People usually think of cybernetics as something 
abominable, they imagine that the world is being 
guided more and more by mechanical brains. They’re 
afraid that the intervention of human genius is 
decreasing. But in point of fact, the opposite is true. 
Cybernetic machines are getting rid of the things that 
encumber us; until now, first-rate brains were 
stockpiling a mass of useless information. It’s 
comforting to know that from now on the machines 
will be supplying the dimensions of the noses in all 
paintings and sculptures; all we’ll have to do is press a 
button or develop a couple of microfilms. In other 
times, the same task would have taken experts and 
scientists decades to finish. The IBM machine will 
clean away all the drudgery and red tape of second-
class human knowledge. Furthermore, the computers 
are already starting to act like human beings and with 
their own psychology.[25] 
 
Although Dalí made these comments in 1969, they were still 
prophetic in nature given that machines were still a long way 
from their modern-day incarnations. Throughout the post-war 
period, Dalí maintained an interest in the very latest scientific 
developments commenting that ‘literati can’t give me anything. 
Scientists give me everything’[6]. He was therefore well 
positioned to gauge the scientific developments of the present 
and the near future. His comments also seem to mirror those of 
Turing in dispelling the scare-mongering about mechanical 
brains. Turing describes the argument that ‘thinking machines 
are simply too awful to contemplate and can therefore never 
become a reality’ as the ‘head in the sand’ objection, dismissing 
it as insufficiently ‘substantial to require refutation’[1].  
In the same decade, the sociologist and philosopher Roger 
Caillois, who had written widely on science in the Surrealist 
journal Minotaure, also posited the existence of a thinking 
computer. He considered its success in terms of its ability to 
compete in an ‘absolute’ chess game: 
 
It is not probable, but it is possible and perhaps 
theoretically necessary that there should be such a 
thing as an absolute chess game, i.e. one in which 
from the first move to the last no stratagem should 
work, since the best possible move is automatically 
neutralised. It is not too farfetched to suppose that an 
electronic computer having exhausted all conceivable 
combinations, could construct this ideal game. 
However, one would no longer be playing chess. The 
first move alone would determine the winner or 
perhaps the loser of the game. [28]  
 
Significantly Caillois wrote this comment in a treatise on 
game-playing entitled Man, play, and games in which mimicry 
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was foregrounded as one of four major characteristics of play3  – 
a concept which was also seen by Turing to be fundamental for 
machines to succeed at the Turing test. Caillois seems to be even 
more positive than Turing about the prospect of a computer 
successfully playing chess. Indeed, his comments seem 
vindicated in as much as the reigning world chess champion, 
Gary Kasparov, was beaten by IBM’s Deep Blue in May 1997. 
On the other hand, Turing believed a computer could evolve to 
play ‘very good chess’ despite making errors, and only after it 
had been programmed to display intelligence: 
 
Can the machine play chess?’ It could fairly easily be 
made to play a rather bad game. It would be bad 
because chess requires intelligence. We stated at the 
beginning of this section that the machine should be 
treated as entirely without intelligence. There are 
indications however that it is possible to make the 
machine display intelligence at the risk of its making 
occasional serious mistakes. By following up this 
aspect the machine could probably be made to play 
very good chess. [29] 
 
He was, however, very positive about the capacity of the 
machine to develop to such a degree as to make it extremely 
difficult for an interrogator to distinguish between human and 
machine in the Turing Test: ‘I believe that in about fifty years’ 
time it will be possible to programme computers ... to make them 
play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will 
not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right 
identification after five minutes of questioning’[1]. Both Turing 
and Caillois thus foresaw a vast improvement in the computer’s 
ability to play games with human beings, even to the point of 
beating them. 
7  CONCLUSION 
Whether in its scientific and theoretical writings or in its visual 
works, the Surrealist imagination mediated a vision of man in 
symbiosis with the machine. This was not an attempt at proving 
irrefutably the viability of machine intelligence when regarded 
as equal or superior to human intelligence (such notions remain 
highly debatable given the limitations of machine intelligence). 
This was, rather, a vision that was inspired by the Zeitgeist of the 
Machine Age and creatively explored the ramifications of the 
scientific discoveries which defined it. Surrealism thus intuited 
facets of the thinking machine as described in Turing’s writings. 
Its view of such a machine was more differentiated and critical 
than that of its avant-garde predecessors, who either idolised 
technology in the manner of Marinetti and the Futurists or 
dismissed it out of hand like the Dadaists. Ernst, Duchamp and 
Picabia’s works were replete with mechanical organisms, which 
were depicted as gendered. These images hinted at the potential 
for machines to imitate human nature and sexual identity, 
bringing Surrealism and the ideas of the Turing Test closer to 
one another. 
    Whereas Ernst and Duchamp’s mechanomorphic forms sought 
to critique the evolution of technology, Picabia’s robots were 
                                                
3 These four characteristics were mimicry, agôn (competition),  
   alea (chance) and ilinx (vertigo). 
conceived as children who were made in the eyes of their human 
creators and needed the latter’s guidance for their future 
development; this notion was also advanced by Turing who 
believed that humans could help to train robots to become 
thinking, reasoning entities. For Matta and Dalí, the same 
energies and structures underpinned both human consciousness 
and technological processes. For Dalí the effect of the 
consciousness apprehending the world was analogous to the role 
of the observer of wave-particles in quantum mechanics, 
reflecting how randomness and subjectivity were an integral part 
of human thought. Turing similarly realised the importance of 
the capacity for randomness within intelligent machinery, 
especially in its simulation of human behaviour. Both Dalí and 
Caillois believed in the future evolution of thinking computers, 
which would replicate human thought processes in the context of 
game play.  In their capacity to merge antinomies (such as 
human and machine) and establish conceptual connections 
between disparate disciplines, the Surrealists anticipated many 
significant aspects of Turing’s thinking machine. 
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